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Abstract In this paper, we show that too strong investor
protection may harm small firms and entrepreneurial ini-
tiatives, which contrasts with the traditional Blaw and
finance^ view that stronger investor protection is better.
This situation is particularly relevant in equity
crowdfunding, which refers to a recent financial innova-
tion originating on the Internet that targets small and
innovative firms. In many jurisdictions, securities regula-
tion offers exemptions to prospectus and registration re-
quirements.We provide an into-depth discussion of recent
regulatory reforms in different countries and discuss how
they may impact equity crowdfunding. Building on a
theoretical framework, we show that optimal regulation
depends on the availability of an alternative early-stage
financing such as venture capital and angel finance. Fi-
nally, we offer exploratory evidence fromGermany on the
impact of securities regulation on small business finance.
Keywords Equity crowdfunding . Crowdinvesting .
Small business finance . Securities regulation . Investor
protection
JEL classifications G20 . G18 . G38 . K22 . L26
1 Introduction
BWe need to have some experience with [equity
crowdfunding] before we take away the safety net
… This is a new and dramatically different proce-
dure with a high potential for fraud.^1
John Coffee Jr. (Columbia University)
Securities regulation is a driving policy tool for en-
suring strong investor protection and, thus, stock market
development (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; La Porta et al.
2006). Traditionally, stronger securities regulations
emerged in response to the financial crises, accounting
scandals, corporate governance problems, and financial
innovations. For example, the United States (US) Con-
gress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Ex-
change Act of 1934 in response to the stock market
crash of 1929 and the resulting Great Depression. These
regulations were intended to mitigate the information
asymmetries between securities issuers and investors,
complementing former state-level legislation in place at
the time. Similar actions were taken in other developed
countries, most recently as a response to the financial
crisis of 2008.
Securities regulation primarily concerns firms, which
seek to place large security issues to the general public.
Fervent debate about reforming securities regulation has
arisen from the emergence of equity crowdfunding (also
referred to as investment-based crowdfunding,
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securities crowdfunding, or crowdinvesting), which de-
scribes a financial innovation in securities issuance that
gives small entrepreneurs access to the general public
(Ahlers et al. 2015; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016;
Vismara 2016a, Vismara 2016b). While transaction
costs made it unlikely in the past that small amounts
would be offered to the general public, the Internet now
provides opportunities to do so. Equity crowdfunding
has therefore become a viable alternative form of exter-
nal finance for entrepreneurial firms in countries that
permit the solicitation of the general public without the
issuance of a costly prospectus. In this paper, we inves-
tigate the impact of securities regulation on equity
crowdfunding and whether securities regulation should
promote equity crowdfunding in order to offer alterna-
tive source of finance to entrepreneurial firms.
Traditional research on securities regulation, such as
that by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), who focus on the
impact of legal rules on stock markets and economic
growth, considers measures of investor protection that
mostly apply to large and publicly traded corporations.
Our approach here is different, because we concentrate
on smaller firms, which are most likely to benefit from
available exemptions. Regarding the exemptions in
securities law, countries differ along the minimum
issuance size that requires compliance with prospectus
and registration requirements that define responsibilities
and liabilities of management concerning information
disclosure. Such differences enable us to explore the
impact of exemptions and, thus, investor protection for
small issuances on equity crowdfunding. Therefore, our
approach takes the perspective proposed by Acs et al.
(2016) in that, it examines the impact of country-
specific institutional arrangements on the pursuit of
micro-level opportunities to create and fund new
ventures.
This paper aims to understand how securities regula-
tion affects equity crowdfunding, in particular, the ex-
emptions to prospectus and registration requirements. In
a first step, we therefore provide an overview of the
legal regime as well as regulatory reforms that have
recently taken place in different jurisdictions (Section 2).
In a second step, we present a theoretical framework
based on small firms deciding between raising their
funds from professional investors (venture capital funds,
business angels) and launching an equity crowdfunding
campaign (Sections 3 and 4). Finally, although data
collection is limited because markets are still nascent,
we offer the first evidence on how the equity
crowdfunding market is emerging and affected by the
regulation in place (Section 5). Consistent with our
predictions, our empirical analysis indicates that firms
raise inefficiently low amounts of money when the
exemptions are restrictive. The German case best evi-
dences these funding constraints. Finally, we discuss
how the existing rules have performed so far and con-
clude (Section 6).
2 Recent reforms promoting equity crowdfunding
In Europe, equity crowdfunding has challenged securi-
ties regulation because it makes use of the exemptions,
as defined in the national regulation of prospectus and
registration requirements. This enables firms to raise
external finance while avoiding incurring significant
compliance costs.2 In many countries, the capital raised
in equity crowdfunding campaigns falls under exemp-
tions, most importantly with regard to the total amount
of the offer. Other exemptions refer to the maximum
number of investors to whom the offer is made, the
minimum contribution imposed on investors, the mini-
mum denomination of the securities offered, and wheth-
er the offer is made to qualified investors only.
Recently, regulators around the world have realized
the economic potential of equity crowdfunding and
started easing the national securities regulation for
crowdfunding activities that take place in the Internet.
At least seven jurisdictions have reformed their securi-
ties regulation to suit the needs of equity crowdfunding
more effectively, while also protecting investors from
fraud up to a certain level and reducing legal uncertainty
for issuing firms. In what follows, we investigate how
legislators have tried to unwind the inefficiency at the
firm level that will be the basis of our theoretical model.
The main reforms are summarized in Table 1.
2 The initial compliance costs of a typical IPO often exceed $1,000,000
because issuers must conduct a due diligence, hire a legal counsel and
underwriter, pay SEC filing fees, state securities filing fees, stock
exchange or OTC registration fees, accounting fees and an increased
D&O insurance premium (Bagley and Dauchy 2003). For equity
crowdfunding, costs are lower because smaller and simpler firms that
do not seek a public listing make offers. Still, according to Darren
Westlake, founder of the UK portal Crowdcube, costs for such pro-
spectus approvals are in the range between £20,000 and £100,000 in
the UK.
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2.1 USA
As a principal rule of the US securities law, securities
that are offered to the general public must be registered
with the SEC. This is to protect investors from securities
fraud by holding the issuer and underwriter of the secu-
rity liable in case of material misstatements or omissions
of material facts. However, to account for the needs of
small offerings, exemptions to this rule exist. For exam-
ple, accredited investors who can fend for themselves or
public offers up to $5,000,000 have been exempted
from registration with the SEC. However, while the
former exemption does per definition not apply to the
larger crowd, the latter exemption was of no use for
equity crowdfunding because the registration at the state
level was still required, making a geographically dis-
persed offer prohibitively expensive.
It was mainly for this reason that the US Congress
passed detailed rules specifically tailored to equity
crowdfunding. On April 5, 2012, the JOBS Act was
signed into law, amending the existing exemptions for
raising capital under Section 4(6) of the Securities Act.
According to Title III of the JOBS Act (also referred to
as CROWDFUND Act), issuers can now raise an over-
all amount of up to $1,000,000 during a 12-month
period without filing a registration statement with the
SEC or at the state level. The legislator tied this exemp-
tion, however, to three conditions: the usage of a broker-
dealer or funding portal, limitations on the amount that
can be sold to individual investors, and disclosure re-
quirements for the issuers.
According to Section 4(6)(C) of the Securities Act,
issuers can now offer or sell securities without a regis-
tration statement if the transactions is conducted through
a broker-dealer or funding portal as defined in
Section 3(a)(4) and Section 3(a)(80) of the Securities
Exchange Act. In this way, the JOBS Act de facto
established a private gatekeeper for equi ty
crowdfunding issues, which is supposed to ensure the
correctness and completeness of the securities offered.
However, the JOBS Act did not make explicit that
funding portals would be liable for material misstate-
ments or the omission of material facts by the issuer.
While the JOBS Act explicitly states that equity
crowdfunding issuers will be liable for such offenses,
it could be argued that the liability of the funding portal
can be derived from Rule 10b-5 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) as well as the previous Supreme
Court decisions (Knight et al. 2012).
In addition, the US legislator strives to protect inves-
tors through limiting the amount that an investor may
invest in the entire market (aggregate limit). According
to the JOBS Act, this aggregate limit shall not exceed
the greater of either $2000 or 5% of the annual income
or net worth of an investor if either the annual income or
the net worth of the investor is less than $100,000. If the
annual income or the net worth of the investor is equal to
or exceeds $100,000, the aggregate limit sold to the
investor shall not exceed 10% of either its annual in-
come or net worth, with the respectively greater value
applying. In any case, the maximum aggregate limit sold
to a single investor shall not exceed $100,000.
Finally, Section 4A(b) of the Securities Act defines
the type of information that must be disclosed to poten-
tial investors. If the overall amount of the securities issue
is equal to or below $100,000, issuers must provide their
most recent income tax returns and financial statements,
which must be certified by the principal executive offi-
cer of the issuer. For issues of more than $100,000 but
less than $500,000, financial statements must be provid-
ed and reviewed by a public accountant, who should be
independent from the issuer. Furthermore, the accoun-
tant must use professional standards and procedures for
the review. For issues of more than $500,000, the issuer
must provide audited financial statements.
In summary, the US equity crowdfunding legislation
has not only established a maximum value for offers
without a prospectus but also set thresholds for the
amounts an individual can invest. By considering the
compliance costs associated with the provision of infor-
mation, the JOBS Act further outlined a three-step ap-
proach on information disclosure. These regulatory
measures were combined with the establishment of a
private gatekeeper.
2.2 Selected reforms in the European Union
The prospectus regulation in the EU has been harmo-
nized for offers larger than €5,000,000 through direc-
tives that were enacted through national implementation
laws by the respective EU member states. Therefore, it
is useful to first present EU-level regulation for prospec-
tus regulation before discussing the recent reforms un-
dertaken by individual jurisdictions.
A main attempt to harmonize regulation on registra-
tion statements was made with the Directive 2003/71/
EC of 4 November 2003, which specifies when and how
a prospectus must be published if securities are offered
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to the general public. More recently, it was amended by
the Directive 2010/73/EU of 24November 2010, which,
among other things, modified the extent of certain ex-
emptions. Exemptions to publishing a prospectus apply
if at least one of the following criteria is met:
[a] The offer is addressed solely to qualified investors;
[b] The offer is addressed to fewer than 150 natural or
legal persons per member state, other than quali-
fied investors;
[c] Investors purchase securities for a total consider-
ation of at least €100,000 per investor;
[d] The denomination per unit amounts to at least
€100,000; and
[e] The offer of securities represents a total consider-
ation of less than €100,000 over a 12-month
period.
In addition to these exemptions, Directive 2010/73/
EU allows national regulators of the EU member states
to increase the amount in point [e] up to €5,000,000.
2.2.1 Italy
The Italian legislator amended the existing securities
law (TUF, Testo Unico della Finanza) and adopted
the first specific equity crowdfunding legislation in
Europe. On October 20, 2012, the Decreto Legge n.
179/2012 went into effect. Exemptions now apply to
innovative startups and after the implementation of
Decreto Legge n. 33/2015 in 2015 also to innovative
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that
offer common equity shares via online portals.
Innovative startups and SMEs complying with the
law can now make offerings of up to €5,000,000
without the obligation to register a prospectus. The
legal definition of an innovative startup and SMEs is
geared to firms, which are not registered with a
regulated market or a multilateral trading facility
and fulfill a lengthy catalog of criteria (see Table 1
for further details). Although the Italian securities
regulator Consob was required to set up a public
register and define disclosure requirements for
innovative startup and SME issuers, it did not have
to define which exemptions and critical threshold for
issues without a prospectus would apply for non-
innovative startups and SMEs. In summary, the
Italian equity crowdfunding regulation established
a very narrow exemption, which might lead to a
considerable amount of legal uncertainty.
2.2.2 Austria
In July 2013, the Austrian legislator changed the national
securities law (KMG, Kapitalmarktgesetz) and raised the
critical threshold for issues without a prospectus from
€100,000 to €250,000. In October 2013, the first equity
crowdfunding was then offered to investors by the portal
1000×1000, with the first issuer Woodero raising a total of
€166,950 after a nearly eight-week funding period. The
amount clearly exceeded the initial value of the critical
threshold for issues without a prospectus, indicating that
issuers would have been constrained under the earlier
regulation. In 2015, Austria adopted a new regulation
(Alternativfinanzierungsgesetz; see Schwienbacher 2016,
for a discussion) and allows issues up to €5,000,000
requesting only a very simplified prospectus from the
issuer (see the Alternativfinanzierings-Informations-
verordnung).
2.2.3 UK
In the UK, equity crowdfunding currently takes place
under the general securities regulation, more precisely
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. In Octo-
ber 2013, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) initi-
ated a consultation on a specific equity crowdfunding
regulation. The new rules were enacted in April 2014
and aim to make equity crowdfunding Bmore accessible
to a wider, but restricted, audience^ of investors, while
also ensuring that Bonly those retail investors who can
understand and bear the various risks involved are in-
vited to invest in unlisted shares or debt securities^. The
FCA only allows the brokering of securities to sophis-
ticated investors, high net worth investors, corporate
finance contacts, or venture capital contacts, retail cli-
ents who confirm that they will receive regulated invest-
ment advice or investment management services from
an authorized person, or retail clients who certify that
they will not invest more than 10% of their net investible
assets in unlisted shares or unlisted debt securities.
2.2.4 France
As a member state of the EU, France implemented the
Prospectus Directive 2010/73/EU and thus applies the
same rules as other EU jurisdictions, with some
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adaptations. The exemption for security offers with a
total amount of less than €100,000 holds. However, for
the range between €100,000 and €1,000,000, an addi-
tional exemption applies if the total amount raised does
not exceed 50% of the existing equity capital of the firm.
For example, a firm can raise €200,000 without a pro-
spectus and registration if it already possesses equity
capital of at least €400,000. This is unlikely to occur for
firms relying on equity crowdfunding, because they
generally have little capital on the balance sheet before
a successful campaign. The French portal Anaxago does
not use the €100,000 limit to exempt firms from the
prospectus regulation but rather limits the offer to fewer
than 150 non-accredited investors. Consequently, inves-
tors are required to participate with high minimum
tickets, as only a subset of the solicited people may
eventually invest. The advantage is that the total amount
of the equity issuance is not limited to €100,000. For the
offerings successfully completed so far, the average
number of crowdinvestors on Anaxago is 25, with an
average amount raised of more than €320,000.
Importantly, French portals need to obtain a license
from the French securities regulator AMF because
they act as financial intermediaries and thus are sub-
ject to their own rules. The former legal status and
requirements in terms of capital imposed on financial
intermediaries made it costly for portals to comply.
On February 14, 2014, the ministry of economic
affairs and finance announced measures to facilitate
equity crowdfunding that have become effective in
autumn 2014. Among other things, the new regulation
contains the following items:
[a] The creation of a special legal entity for accredited
equity crowdfunding portals, which differs from
the one that other financial intermediaries use (so-
called Conseiller en Investissement Participatif).
No minimum equity capital is required for this
legal entity. However, it must comply with trans-
parency rules that ensure that the crowd obtains
Bfair^ and Bunbiased^ information on the offers.
[b] Investors must undergo a test that determines their
risk profile, the results of which must be in line
with the risks involved in equity crowdfunding.
Crowdinvestors must also be made aware when
registering at the portal of the risks involved in
equity crowdfunding.
[c] The threshold of exemption is increased to
€1,000,000, provided the equity crowdfunding
campaign takes place on an Internet portal that
has received formal approval from the AMF.
[d] Obligation of the issuers to supply simplified doc-
umentation to the investors, as described in the
reform (but not subject to approval by the AMF).
2.2.5 Belgium
In 2014, Belgium introduced a reform as a way to foster
equity crowdfunding while at the same time acting
cautiously to avoid a bubble. The new regulation allows
issuances up to €300,000 provided no investor is
allowed to invest more than €1000 per campaign. Un-
like in the USA, the Belgian regulator has defined the
amount that an investor may invest in the same issuer
(single issuer limit) not the overall market. The law
requires that issuers explicitly state this single issuer
limit in the offer. If the single issuer limit is not imposed,
issuers remain limited at raising no more than €100,000.
However, the Belgian market remains small and most
offers are even today below €100,000.
2.2.6 Germany
Unlike other European countries, Germany recently passed
a specific legislation and for a long time followed a laissez-
faire approach towards equity crowdfunding, which had
taken place within the scope of the existing securities law.
As a general rule, the German Securities Prospectus Act
(WpPG, Wertpapierprospektgesetz) and the Investment
Act (VermAnlG, Vermögensanlagengesetz) set the critical
threshold for security and investment issues without a
prospectus equal to €100,000 (Section 3 Abs. 2 Satz 1
Nr. 5 WpPG). However, the definition of what constitutes
an investment under the Investment Act was not all-
encompassing and left out subordinated profit-
participating loans. This omission left scope for the issuers
either to comply with the existing exemptions and raise up
to €100,000 or to bypass the relevant laws altogether by
structuring the investment contract in a way that allowed
for offers of unlimited amounts.
On 23 April 2015, the German Parliament passed the
Small Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz)
to regulate equity crowdfundingmore specifically.Accord-
ing to the new regulation, firms can offer up to €2,500,000
without the obligation to register a prospectus. Similar to
the US JOBS Act, the amount sold to a single investor
shall generally not exceed €1000. Investors might invest
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up to €10,000 per campaign if their wealth exceeds
€100,000. If the investor does not have that amount of
assets, the limit is twice the investor’s monthly net income,
but in any case not more than €10,000. Most importantly,
this new rule again holds only for specific forms of invest-
ments (subordinated profit-participating loans), which did
previously not fall under the definition of an investment.
For other types of investments, which are commonly used
in crowdfunding campaigns as well (silent partnerships
and non-securitized participation rights), firms will only
be able to offer €100,000 without the obligation to register
a prospectus (Klöhn et al. 2016).
3 Model description
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework that
allows us to examine the impact of exemptions to pro-
spectus regulation on the fundraising decisions of small
firms, who can decide between active, professional in-
vestors (such as venture capital funds or business an-
gels), and the crowd (general public). Themodel offers a
setting that considers the issuance of non-listed securi-
ties without a registered prospectus. It focuses on the
main exemption from the prospectus regulation, namely,
the total amount of the offer. The proposed analysis will
help understand how the emergence of equity
crowdfunding as an alternative source of equity finance
to professional investors affects the firm’s choice of
financing source and ultimately optimal regulation. This
in turn may offer guidance in the question whether
regulation should promote equity crowdfunding.
To this end, we rely on a theoretical framework that is
based on managerial rent diversion (Shleifer and
Wolfenzon 2002). Managers divert rents away when not
properly monitored. While professional investors are as-
sumed able to cope with such managerial inefficiency, the
crowd is assumed not able to adequately monitor the
management. Further, we introduce the fact that the two
types of investors offer adding value, either through active
participation in the firm by professional investors
(Gompers and Lerner 2000) or wisdom of the crowd in
which crowdinvestors offer their ideas and feedback to the
entrepreneur (Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2016).3 In order
to be agnostic about the absolute size of these two forms of
additional value, we focus on the difference between the
two. To abstract from discounting future values and with-
out loss of generality, let us assume all the parties are risk-
neutral and the risk-free rate equals zero. This simplifying
assumption implied a discount rate of zero.
3.1 Issuing firms
We consider an economy populated by a continu-
um of firms uniformly distributed along the capital
needs dimension θ̃~[0;Θ], which specifies the level
of their individual investment opportunities. Firms
have a return on investment (ROI) of vi > 0 (iden-
tical for all firms), with i ϵ {C,P}, up to the level
θ̃ and 0 beyond. Thus, the amount θ̃ represents
external capital needs as well as desired invest-
ment size. Subscript C corresponds to equity
crowdfunding, while P to professional investors.
We consider that the type of financing affects the
ROI, since each type of investor may add value.
Under this setting, a firm raising and investing
an amount θ ≤ θ̃ will generate a value of (1 + vi)
θ, resulting in a net present value (NPV) of viθ. If
not adequately monitored, entrepreneurs can divert
a fraction δ > 0 of the NPV so that shareholders
eventually receive only a value of (1-δ)viθ. Entre-
preneurs privately receive (1-x)δviθ from this di-
version, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; the remaining fraction x
(i.e., the value xδviθ) is lost so that it generates an
inefficiency for all shareholders. Entrepreneurs are
impacted in two ways: as shareholders, entrepre-
neurs lose value due to diversion in a similar way
as any other shareholder; as managers, they gain
as they divert some value privately. Depending on
the relative size of the two opposing effects, en-
trepreneurs may overall gain or lose. To restrict
the analysis to the case in which diversion is
optimal in the absence of adequate monitoring,
we impose the following condition under equity
crowdfunding (the derivation is provided in the
next section):
Diversion Condition : x < 1= 1þ vcð Þ 1− fð Þ½ 
The diversion condition ensures that, in equilibrium,
entrepreneurs will divert corporate resources whenever
3 The crowd may at times also enjoy other, non-financial benefits from
participating as shareholder in the development of startups
(Belleflamme et al. 2014). We abstract from these extra benefits here,
as these are more likely to be important in other forms of
crowdfunding.
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they are not constrained by shareholders or regulation. If
the condition is not met, then the entrepreneur will not
divert any resources even in the absence of monitoring
since he would lose more in profits as shareholder than
what he gets from diverting privately.
3.2 Funding choices: professional investors versus
equity crowdfunding
We assume that firms have no internal funds available
and thus need to raise the entire capital externally. For
simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur initially
owns 100% of the firm. When raising capital, entrepre-
neurs give up a fraction (1-α) of the equity, with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The value of α is determined so that the
crowd or professional investors are willing to invest
under a take-it-or-leave-it offer, while facing an oppor-
tunity cost of 0.
Professional investors can enforce internally ef-
fective governance rules. They traditionally do en-
force contracts, because they hold larger equity
stakes and participate on the board of directors.
Moreover, they generally draft tailored contracts
that enable effective intervention in case founders
do not behave due diligently. However, interven-
tion by professional investors is time-consuming
and thus costly. For costs, we define them by the
variable M > 0. We regard costs M as monitoring
and management costs4 that investors incur.
To derive practice-relevant implications, we in-
troduce the fact that the availability of finance
from professional investors varies across countries.
While venture capitalists and business angels are
well-developed and able to inject very large
amounts in startups in some countries like the
USA, these amounts tend to be smaller in other
countries especially in continental Europe. Thus,
let us consider the maximum amount professional
investors can provide to be denoted by S. The
parameter S proxies for the development of the
venture capital and business angel market in a
country. This assumption can be motivated by the
fact that the size of venture capital funds varies
across countries due to a smaller supply of capital
to the venture capital markets, combined with the
standard restrictions that venture capital funds typ-
ically cannot invest more than a certain amount or
percentage of total funds in a single portfolio
company (Metrick 2007).
The second source of funding considered here is
equity crowdfunding. Crowdinvestors may want to
impose similar corporate governance and disclo-
sure rules that mitigate agency costs. However,
even if such governance rules were included in a
contract, crowdinvestors could not enforce them
because of coordination problems that result from
free riding. The crowd is dispersed and rather
passive. We consider this to be a reasonable as-
sumption for the market, given the type of indi-
viduals participating in equity crowdfunding cam-
paigns. In addition, the crowd does not sit on the
board of directors of the firms.
Portals incur costs from managing the website
and preparing the firm for the campaign, including
drafting investment contract and some of the basic
due diligence. In practice, these costs are passed
on to the firms. We consider a percentage fee,
since the bulk of the portals use such a fee struc-
ture. Let us define the fee by f > 0, which is
charged to the firm after a successful campaign.
3.3 The regulator
The regulator imposes registration and ex ante
disclosure requirements for any security offer to
the general public above a given threshold amount
T ≥ 0, which can be larger or smaller than S. This
view is consistent with real-world exemptions, as
we have shown in Section 2. A higher threshold
value of T implies a lower investor protection in
general, because fewer firms comply with securi-
ties regulation.
Complying with these requirements leads to fixed
costs of C > 0 for the firms, which may differ from
monitoring costs M incurred by professional investors.
These compliance costs may arise for different reasons;
some may be incurred by filing with the regulator, while
others may be due to the disclosure of relevant informa-
tion to investors. We assume firms complying with
disclosure regulation can no longer divert value for
private purposes. Consistent with practice, we assume
that firms can only seek compliance with the regulator if
their capital needs are larger than T. In what follows, we
4 UnderM, we consider any costs other than B‘effort costs^’ that would
lead to moral hazard. Thus, we assume costs M as those costs that are
borne by investors by the sake of being B‘sophisticated^’. These costs
include legal costs as well as costs incurred from running a manage-
ment firm.
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assume that costs C are too high for the firms considered
in our baseline model.
We consider a benevolent regulator who maximizes
total welfare in the economy that is the sum of value
created by the firms seeking external finance. Thus, the
regulator balances the social costs and benefits generat-
ed by setting the variable T.
3.4 Time line
We consider the following time line. At time t = 0, the
regulator sets T, which becomes public knowledge. At
t = 1, the firm decides whether to raise funds from a
professional investor or through equity crowdfunding. At
t = 2, entrepreneurs make investment decisions, by decid-
ing how much to raise and thus offer a fraction (1-α) of
ownership. Finally, at t = 3 firms realize their payoffs,
which are then distributed. Consistent with rational behav-
ior, we solve the game by backward induction and maxi-
mize firm value based on the entrepreneur’s perspective.
4Optimal choice of funding and securities regulation
4.1 Optimal outcome for the entrepreneur
In this section, we derive the optimal choice of funding.
We first consider the outcome under equity
crowdfunding and professional investors separately
and then compare them.
Case [1]: under equity crowdfunding, an entrepreneur
with given capital needs θ̃ ≤ T receives α[(1 +
vc)θ̃(1 − f) − δvcθ̃(1 − f)] + (1 − x)δvcθ̃(1 − f), subject to
the crowd at least breaking even in their investment:
(1 − α)[(1 + vc)θ̃(1 − f) − δvcθ̃(1 − f)] = θ̃. The first term
in the first equation represents the financial gains to the
entrepreneur of also being a shareholder (net of diversion
costs δvcθ̃(1 − f)), the second one (1 − x)δvcθ̃(1 − f) her
private benefits from diversion.5 This leads to the
following gains for the entrepreneur: (1 − xδ)vcθ̃(1 − f).
Any firm with θ̃ > T will not raise more than T, as
otherwise the firm would need to obtain a costly prospec-
tus approval; thus, gains are capped at (1-xδ)vcT(1-f). The
portal receives the total fees of fθ̃ from the firm raising θ̃.
Case [2]: under professional investor finance, the
entrepreneur will raise a capital amount of θ̃ ≤ S and
receives α(1 + vp)θ̃, subject to investor at least breaking
even in the investment: (1 −α)(1 + vp)θ̃ = [θ̃ +M]. Here,
only financial returns accrue to the entrepreneur, since
no diversion takes place. Thus, the entrepreneur receives
vpθ̃ −M. Any firm with θ̃ > S will have its gains capped
at vpT −M.
Both outcomes under [1] and [2] are depicted in
Fig. 1 whenever S > T. It is straightforward to derive
the threshold level of T, called Ṯ that makes equity
crowdfunding as efficient as professional investors:
T

such that 1−xδð Þvc T

1− fð Þ ¼ vp T

−M or :
T

¼ M=
"
vp− 1−xδð Þvc 1− fð Þ
#
Therefore, equity crowdfunding is the optimal choice
of entrepreneurs seeking capital lower than Ṯ, and oth-
erwise opting for professional investors is optimal.
Above the amount S, professional investor can no longer
supply the full amount, so that the firm needs to seek
prospectus approval from the regulator. Note that fees
charged by portals also affect the threshold, since fees
reduce the amount left for investments and thus the
overall profitability of the firm. Higher portal fees re-
duce profits under equity crowdfunding, making it less
attractive relative to professional investors. The result is
a lower Ṯ. Moreover, differences in adding value be-
tween the crowd (vc) and professional investors (vp) shift
the threshold Ṯ. An increase in vc relative to vp increases
Ṯ, which is consistent with equity crowdfunding becom-
ing more profitable and thus more attractive relative to
professional investors.
When S < T (the venture capital and angel market is
poorly developed), a discontinuity occurs. The size of
the discontinuity depends on the magnitude of the dif-
ference between S and T, as depicted in Fig. 2. Also,
there is an area (gray shaded in Fig. 2) that represents
firms with capital needs (θ̃) that are larger than the
threshold T. These firms can only raise the amount T,
since raising more would lead to less profit due to the
lack of larger amounts from professional investors and
5 These simple formulas allow to formally derive the Diversion Con-
dition, where we need to solve the following condition α[(1 +
vc)θ̃(1 − f) − δvcθ̃(1 − f)] + (1 − x)δvcθ̃(1 − f) > α[(1 + vc)θ̃(1 − f)],
subject to (1 − α)(1 + vc)θ̃(1 − f) = θ̃. The left-hand side of the
inequality is the entrepreneur’s profits under equity crowdfunding
when diverting value from shareholders (as stated above); the right-
hand side is her profits when not diverting; finally, the second equation
gives the equilibrium financing condition for the crowd under the
assumption that the entrepreneur does not divert any profits. Substitut-
ing α from the second equation into the inequality leads to the Diver-
sion Condition as stated above.
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excessive inefficiencies under equity crowdfunding.
These firms consequently forego some of their invest-
ment opportunities, because there is no source of capital
available to (efficiently) fund them.
It is optimal for the entrepreneur to seek equity
crowdfunding below Ṯ for the same reason as above,
but potentially also for larger amounts if the small offer
exemption level T is large enough to make it worth-
while. In the case depicted in Fig. 2, this is not happen-
ing, but would happen if Twould be as large as T . Then,
larger equity crowdfunding campaigns would occur. T
can formally be derived as the solution to the following
condition (assuming investors under prospectus approv-
al add as much value as professional investors consid-
ered so far; i.e., vp):
1−xδð ÞvcT 1− fð Þ ¼ vpT−C or :
T ¼ C
.
vp− 1−xδð Þvc 1− fð Þ
 
4.2 Market equilibrium under endogenous regulation
Figures 1 and 2 are helpful in deriving the optimal level of
exemption, denoted below as T*, from the perspective of
the securities regulator. This level is affected by the degree
of development and efficiency of the venture capital and
business angel market. However, a note is warranted here.
Our optimal outcome abstracts from effects that such
exemptions may have on the other firms seeking equity
finance. Therefore, we will consider below the lowest
possible exemption value as being the optimum, as it also
minimizes any impact on other firms in the economy.
Formally, the optimal level of exemption for equity
crowdfunding is as follows:
T* ¼ T if T < S T* ¼ T if T > S
This result yields the following empirical implica-
tions. First, a more developed venture capital and busi-
ness angels market enables a lower threshold Ṯ, since it
has a higher S (professional investors can finance firms
with larger capital needs as their funds are larger) and
lower M (professional investors are able to do more
cost-efficient contracting and monitoring).6 Thus, it
does not require the regulator to set a higher level of
exemption. For sufficiently large venture capital and
6 Empirically, costs M may be proxied by the number of law firms and
the quality of legal institutions, as this affects legal costs of drafting
contracts and advising services for venture capital funds.
Financing Outcomes when S>TFig. 1 Financing outcomes when
S > T. INV-finance denotes the
outcome under financing with
professional investors, ECF-
finance with equity
crowdfunding. The x-axis
represents the amount to be
issued, while the y-axis the
entrepreneur’s profit level. The
point Ṯ corresponds to the
situation where the entrepreneur
is indifferent between the two
financing alternatives
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business angel markets, the exemption level can even be
substantially reduced.
Moreover, when S > T (the more general case),
the condition derived above indicates that Ṯ is de-
creasing in the following, exogenous parameters:
extent of managerial rent diversion (the parameter
δ), the degree of losses derived from such diversion
(the parameter x), and portal fees (the parameter f).
For the ROI, the direction of impact depends on
whether we consider vc or vp, as discussed above.
A greater rent extraction possibility creates a higher
cost of capital under equity crowdfunding, since
crowdinvestors will require a higher rate of return
for purchasing securities from the firm. Similarly,
greater losses from diversion and higher portal fees
make again equity crowdfunding less valuable rela-
tive to professional investors, which reduces the
optimal level of exemption.
For the opposite case where S < T (see Fig. 2), the
regulator has an incentive to increase T to compensate
for shortage of professional investors. The optimal level
is T . This scenario corresponds to cases in which ven-
ture capital and business angel markets are underdevel-
oped. Overall, we expect regulators in countries with
smaller venture capital and business angel markets to
have incentives to set less restrictive exemptions.
4.3 Empirical implications
The parameter T can be directly interpreted as the level
of investor protection, in which a lower value of T
represents more investor protection on average. The
conclusions of our theoretical model lead to the follow-
ing empirical predictions. First, more investor protection
leads to fewer equity crowdfunding campaigns, since
the bulk (if not all) of these campaigns take place under
securities regulation exemptions. This may eventually
create a smaller equity crowdfunding market, because
many firms will find it economically not worthwhile to
seek prospectus approval by the national regulator.
Others may seek financing from professional investors.
In the absence of any exemptions, smaller firms may
Financing Outcomes when S<T
Fig. 2 Financing outcomes when S < T. INV-finance denotes the
outcome under financing with professional investors, ECF-finance
with equity crowdfunding. The red line shows the outcome with a
formal prospectus for either traditional capital markets or equity
crowdfunding campaigns above the small offerings exemption T,
for which amounts of issuancesmust be larger than the threshold T.
The x-axis represents the amount to be issued, while the y-axis the
entrepreneur’s profit level. The point Tcorresponds to the situation
where the entrepreneur is indifferent between equity crowdfunding
and financing with a formal prospectus (if the threshold where
large enough to allow equity crowdfunding campaigns to be larger
than , which is not the case in this figure; therefore, this range of
outcomes is indicated in a dotted box at the top of the figure as
BECF^). The dotted part of the black and red lines represents
possible outcomes if the regulator changes T
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even refrain from entering the market in the first place,
since equity crowdfunding may be their only option in
terms of equity finance. The complete absence of an
exemption (T = 0) leads to an exclusion of firms with the
lowest capital needs, which would not be started in the
first place. This is especially true if there is not a suffi-
ciently large, professional market available as main
alternative source of seed capital.
Our main conclusion from this analysis is that regu-
lation maximizing investor protection hurts small firms
and those relying on equity crowdfunding are likely to
be smaller firms seeking seed or early-stage capital. This
is because these firms are too small to obtain funding
from professional investors and thus may lack alterna-
tive sources of equity capital. Optimal securities regula-
tion therefore has to trade off the costs of ensuring
sufficient investor protection with the benefit of easier
access to capital for startup firms, which can be an
important driver for economic growth.
The extent to which exemptions to the prospectus
regulation are needed depends on the availability of
alternative sources of capital, mostly from professional
investors. Countries with well-developed markets of
professional and private investors may have fewer ex-
emptions. Interestingly, the USA has a well-developed
professional investor market, which can compensate for
the lack of exemptions needed to tap the crowd. This
contrasts with Europe, where the angel and venture
capital markets are smaller.
We further expect a substitution to occur away from
professional investors, not for firms with lower capital
needs but with average levels. With equity crowdfunding,
these firms now have an alternative source of funding. For
some firms, the latter may economically be more interest-
ing, so that they seek funding from the crowd instead of
professional investors. In fact, changing the level of small
offer exemption T may have no impact on equity
crowdfunding activities in business sectors that are well-
covered by professional investors, except for very small
issuances. However, other areas may be affected more
when poorly covered by professional investors. This may
be more likely in areas with limited growth prospects.
5 Are existing exemptions too restrictive: some
empirical evidence
In this section, we illustrate the impact of exemptions as
defined in national securities regulation on equity
crowdfunding campaigns. To achieve this goal, we offer
evidence that restrictive exemptions may create a
funding gap, where firms raise inefficiently low
amounts of capital.
As our theoretical model predicts, firms may re-
strict their fundraising goal if the small offer exemp-
tion threshold is low. One good example is Germa-
ny, which after the UK possesses one of the most
developed equity crowdfunding market in Europe
(Hornuf and Schmitt 2016) but for a long time set
the critical threshold for the small offerings exemp-
tion at the lower bound of €100,000. We illustrate
that this regulation created a funding gap by relying
on the cases of Seedmatch and Companisto. More-
over, like many other continental European coun-
tries, the German venture capital and business angel
markets are much less-developed than in countries
such as the USA and the UK.
The contracts that Seedmatch provided to issuers
were initially designed to comply with the German
Inves tment Act . Al l the in i t i a l 26 equi ty
crowdfundings offered by Seedmatch used the
existing exemption, and a total of 24 issues had to
be terminated at the threshold of the exemption at
€100,000, which indicates that issuers had higher
capital needs. Moreover, as campaigns were some-
times funded very quickly,7 firms’ capital needs
could have easily been satisfied by the crowd and
were only constrained by the existing threshold un-
der the Investment Act (see Fig. 3).
Seedmatch and other portals soon realized the
legally imposed funding constraint and tried to cir-
cumvent the existing securities legislation. On No-
vember 29, 2012, Seedmatch offered for the first
time subordinated profit-participating loans, which
until July 10, 2015 were not classified as investment
under the German Investment Act and thus did not
require the registration of a prospectus. While there
was some legal uncertainty surrounding this issue,
subordinated profit-participating loans allowed is-
suers to raise unlimited amounts without the obliga-
tion to draft and register a prospectus.
The equity crowdfunding campaigns on Companisto
show a similar trend after the portal switched contracts
7 On November 29, 2012, it took Protonet only 48 min to raise
€200,000 on Seedmatch. In May 2014, the same firm raised another
€1,500,000 in 10 h and 8 min, after which the founders decided to
continue raising funds. Eventually, they raised €3,000,000 in a few
days only.
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to subordinated profit-participating loans on February
4, 2013. After the implementation of the new invest-
ment contract, the funding volumes per campaign
more than sextupled on Companisto, while on
Seedmatch they almost quadrupled. The largest issue
funded under this contractual design raised a total of
€7,500,000 for a real estate project. A comparison
with Innovestment, which might serve as a control
group because the portal has not adopted subordinated
profit-participating loans, evidences that the increase
in funding volumes does not merely reflect a general
trend in the selection of funding campaigns. The
average funding size at Innovestment was €60,085,
somewhat below the threshold of €100,000, and in-
creased only slightly to €64,796 in the period when
Seedmatch adopted subordinated profit-participating
loans.
6 Discussion and concluding remarks
This study discusses recent reforms in different countries
and presents some empirical evidence based on the Ger-
man experience in permitting non-accredited investors
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Fig. 3 Amounts raised in equity
crowdfunding campaigns on
Seedmatch (N = 84), Companisto
(N = 47), and Innovestment
(N = 47) in the period from
August 1, 2011 to January 1,
2016. The red lines separate the
period before and after
subordinated profit-participating
loans were used to circumvent the
threshold of the small offering
exemption as defined in the
German securities law
(T = €100,000). Before financial
contracts circumvented the
threshold, the average amounts
raised were €98,048 for
Seedmatch campaigns and
€91,673 for Companisto cam-
paigns; thereafter, the amounts
rose to €391,440 and €596,827,
respectively (including amounts
pledged in unsuccessful cam-
paigns). Innovestment never
changed its investment contract to
circumvent the threshold of the
German securities law and ex-
hibits an average funding amount
of €60,085 per campaign
(including amounts pledged in
unsuccessful campaigns).
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access to equity crowdfunding.While our analysis remains
exploratory, it contributes to the ongoing policy debate on
how to regulate the market and to examine its potential
impact on business finance. This debate is motivated by
the fear expressed by some regulators and academics that
entrepreneurs may take advantage of the less sophisticated
crowd, by strategically avoiding to raise capital from so-
phisticated investors (Hazen 2012; Griffin 2013).
Our simple theoretical framework generates key
policy implications in relation with alternative sources
of entrepreneurial finance. A central implication is that
benefits related to weaker investor protection that pro-
mote equity crowdfunding markets are higher when the
availability of venture capital and angel capital is scarce.
The notion that strong investor protection can be harm-
ful is counter-intuitive to the traditional law and finance
literature that focuses on large firms. A tailored regula-
tion may therefore be needed for equity crowdfunding,
as securities regulation primarily deals with regulating
large issuances and therefore impose significant
compliance costs that are prohibitively high for small
firms. Moreover, a lack of specific regulation for equity
crowdfunding may induce portals to resemble online
angel networks and thus offer little differentiation with
existing sources of entrepreneurial finance.
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